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Abstract 
 
It is a well-established fact that many people view the prospect of premature death by some 
causes with considerably more disquiet or “dread” than other causes.  It is equally clear that 
for most people their personal risk of death by a given cause is also a matter of serious 
concern. This article reports the findings of a study aimed at estimating the effects of dread 
and personal risk of death by a specific cause on the willingness-to-pay based Value of 
Statistical Life (VSL) for that cause. 
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Dread Risks 
It is by now well-known that people typically view the prospect of premature death by some 
causes with considerably more dread than they do for other causes – see for example Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1981); Thomas (1981); Mendeloff and Kaplan (1990); McDaniels, 
Kamlet and Fischer (1992); Savage (1993); Tolley, Kenkel and Fabian (1995); Jones-Lee and 
Loomes (1995). 
 
Sunstein (1997) argues convincingly that, in certain circumstances, a “bad death” premium 
may be appropriate when valuing avoidance of certain types of death. These circumstances 
include, amongst others, those types of death that are particularly abhorrent or frightening, 
lack “voluntariness” and control or induce feelings of empathy with victims. 
 
Set against this is the possibility that personal baseline risk for the cause of death concerned 
(the current level of risk faced by the individual prior to any risk reduction policy 
implementation) also matters to people when forming their risk preferences over alternative 
options -  see, for example, Viscusi (1979) or Covey (2001).  Such a concern could interact in 
some way with people’s feelings of dread towards the different risks. This might to some 
extent explain the rather counter-intuitive finding of Chilton et al. (2002), that the willingness 
to pay-based Value of Statistical Life (VSL) for rail accidents and fires in public places – 
arguably fairly highly  dreaded under the above criteria –  in fact stood at a discount relative 
to the road accidents VSL1. Clearly, this could well reflect the fact that dread effects for rail 
accidents and fires in public places are effectively offset by their low baseline risks relative to 
road accidents. 
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Before proceeding further, we believe that it is important to be clear about the precise sense in 
which the terms “dread” and “risk” are being used in the present context. Clearly, an 
individual’s overall attitude – including fear and anxiety – concerning the possibility that he 
or she may die prematurely by some particular cause will depend on a variety of factors. In 
addition to the individual’s own personal characteristics and circumstances, these will 
typically include his or her anticipation of the degree of pain and suffering that will precede 
death; the degree of voluntariness and control associated with the particular cause of death; 
the time at which death might occur; responsibility; blame, and so on, as well as the 
magnitude of the risk (i.e. probability) of the event occurring. In what follows “dread” will be 
used as a “catchall” term that applies to all of these factors with the exception of the risk (i.e. 
probability) of death per se. 
 
The way in which dread and personal baseline risk thus defined affect peoples’ marginal rates 
of substitution (MRS) between wealth and risk of death has profound implications for policy 
making with respect to the VSL for any specific cause of death.  In particular, a version of an 
argument presented in Jones-Lee (1976) indicates that, under reasonable assumptions, an 
individual’s MRS between wealth and risk of death by a given cause will, ceteris paribus, be 
a non-decreasing function of the individual’s baseline risk of death by that cause and that it 
will indeed typically be a strictly increasing function.  Given that for many everyday causes 
of premature death, dread and baseline risk may be negatively correlated, it is clear therefore 
that they could tend to have opposite effects on an individual’s MRS of wealth for risk though 
theory, as such, gives no indication of the extent to which one effect can be expected to offset 
the other.  The answer to this question is therefore essentially empirical and may well differ 
from one case to another.  
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In the light of these considerations the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) commissioned 
an empirical study to investigate these issues.  This required the development of a dedicated 
methodology based on the premise that both dread and cause-specific baseline risk may 
matter to people when considering wealth-risk tradeoffs and, further, that the two components 
are in some way separable.  Given the novelty of the approach, a number of validity tests 
were also built into the investigation.  In addition, it should be noted at this stage that in the 
course of our study it became clear that the methodology uncovered some rather unexpected 
choice heuristics employed by a number of respondents.  This necessitated a complementary 
theoretical investigation to accommodate such behaviour within our empirical framework, 
which is based on an extension of the risk-risk methodology pioneered by Viscusi et al. 
(1991).  The results of this are considered later in the paper.  
 
In what follows we report the development and application of our protocol designed to 
disaggregate an individual’s marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk of death into what 
appear to be its two main driving factors.  We find that while substantial dread elements are 
indeed present in certain types of death, these appear in some cases to be cancelled out to a 
large extent by low baseline risks. Nevertheless, this does not always hold, implying support 
for the observation that the inclusion of dread premia in a cause-specific VSL can only be 
justified on a case-by-case basis.   
 
The causes of premature death considered in the paper are automobile driver/passenger deaths, 
pedestrian accidents, accidents in the home, fires in public places, domestic fires, drowning, 
rail accidents, hazardous production plant accidents and murder2.  Notice that these are all 
causes that result in instant (or near-instant) death.  Causes that result in protracted periods of 
pain or suffering prior to eventual death, such as heart disease or lung cancer are not 
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considered in this study as they are characterised by different and varying protracted periods 
of pain and suffering prior to eventual death.  As such they are not suited to our methodology 
which focuses on the interaction between dread and baseline risk effects, ceteris paribus. It is 
also important to stress the fact that having specified a given cause of death, no further 
information was provided to respondents concerning the precise circumstances that would be 
associated with premature death by that cause (e.g. whether a rail accident would involve a 
head-on collision or a derailment etc.). This was done in order to ensure that, as far as 
possible, respondents imputed their own personal perceptions and attitudes to the causes of 
death concerned. 
 
 The baseline average annual risks of premature death in the UK for each of the causes 
considered were as follows: 
Table 1 about here 
Risks were expressed with respect to a denominator of 50 million for two reasons, namely: 
 a) because for some of the causes of death considered in the study the baseline risk is so 
small that with risk expressed in the form of say, x in 100,000 per annum, it would be 
necessary to set x as a very small fraction (for fires in public places, for example, in the UK 
the baseline average annual risk of death is about 0.06 in 100,000) which might prove to be 
confusing for some respondents in a sample survey and b) because the total population of 
England and Wales is about 50 million, a fact of which respondents were reminded prior to 
answering the risk-risk questions. 
 
While respondents were presented with these baseline average annual risks for each of the 
various causes of premature death considered in the study, it is important to appreciate that 
they were also asked to indicate whether they regarded themselves as being below, equal to or 
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above average risk for the cause concerned and to give an indication of the extent (if any) of 
their deviation from average. For each respondent subsequent questions were then based on 
these “personalised” levels of exposure. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides the theoretical background to the 
methodology, while Section 3 describes its implementation.  Sections 4 and 5 consider the 
general nature of the broad response patterns that emerged in the study, while Section 6 
reports the detailed empirical results. Section 7 then considers the robustness of the estimation 
procedure and empirical results, while the relative impact of dread effects and baseline risks 
on the VSL are tentatively examined through an econometric exercise in Section 8.  Section 9 
concludes. 
 
1. The “risk-risk” methodology 
We extend Viscusi et al’s (1991) “risk-risk” methodology to account for the potential 
separability of  baseline risk and dread effects.  Thus, consider an individual who is 
indifferent between a change δp  in the annual risk of death by cause A and a change δq in the 
annual risk of death by cause B.  Arguably, the ratio 
δq
δp
 then reflects precisely two factors, 
namely : a) any differential in the degree of dread (widely construed) that the individual 
associates with each of the two causes, and b) any difference between the baseline risk that 
the individual faces for each of the two causes.  More specifically, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that 
δq
δp
 will tend to be larger a) the more death by cause B is dreaded relative to 
death by cause A and b) the larger the individual’s baseline risk of death by cause B relative 
to his/her baseline risk of death by cause A. 
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Now suppose that before identifying the indifference risk changes δqandδp  for death by 
each of the two clearly identified causes of death, the question is put in a “contextless” format 
without the causes being identified, but with the baseline risks clearly specified.  Let us 
denote the individual’s indifference risk changes for this contextless risk-risk question by 
qδandpδ ˆˆ  respectively.  In this case, it would appear that the ratio 
qδ
pδ
ˆ
ˆ
 can reflect only one  
factor, namely the individual’s attitude to any difference between the baseline risks for the 
two causes.  If the question is then subsequently put in a “contextual” format with the baseline 
risks and  causes of death clearly identified and the individual’s indifference risk-change ratio 
now becomes 
δq
δp
 then it seems reasonable to suppose that any difference between the 
contextual ratio 
qδ
pδ
ratioscontextlestheand
δq
δp
ˆ
ˆ
 must be attributable exclusively to the relative 
dread that the individual associates with each of the two causes with, in particular 
qδ
pδ
δq
δp
ˆ
ˆ
>  
indicating that cause B is more dreaded than cause A and vice versa.  While it is not essential 
to the argument that follows, it seems most natural – and, indeed, is analytically most 
straightforward – to assume that the individual’s dread effect for context B relative to that for 
context A, denoted by BAD , is essentially given by the ratio of qδ
pδ
torelative
δq
δp
ˆ
ˆ
 that is  
 
q/δpδ
δp/δqDBA
ˆˆ
=           (1) 
with BAD  being larger, the more death by cause B is dreaded relative to death by cause A. 
 
2. Implementation of the dread risk elicitation protocol 
The protocol was developed and refined over a three-month period prior to implementation in 
order to ensure that in the main study respondents would understand the various questions and 
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to highlight areas where additional practice examples and discussions would still be necessary.  
In this way it was hoped to minimise any errors arising because of misunderstanding of the 
task, as opposed to its innate difficulty, so that the use of any unexpected response strategies 
would be more likely to reflect real preferences rather than random choices. 
 
Respondents in the main study participated in a relatively intensive focus group-like 
procedure with some open-ended discussion.  However, all risk-risk trade-off questions were 
answered on a strictly individual basis.  Below, we summarise the main procedures/stages 
within the protocol. 
 
In the first stage, focus group participants were introduced to the general nature of the study 
and the risk concepts that they would be dealing with. The purpose of this stage was to ensure 
that, when answering the risk-risk questions the respondent was aware of the size of the 
average baseline levels of risk and to give an indication on a questionnaire response sheet 
whether they regarded themselves as being much lower than average, below average, average, 
above average or much higher than average risk for the various causes of death to be 
considered in the study.  Thus, for example, a respondent who only rarely travelled by rail 
might reasonably be expected to regard him/herself as being at much lower than average risk 
of death in a rail accident.    Respondents were then asked to “quantify” their own perceived 
personal risk for each cause.  For example, a respondent who was told that the average annual 
risk of death in a rail accident was 40 in 50 million and believed that she was “much lower 
than average” might allocate a number of 5 in 50 million.  All subsequent risk-risk tradeoffs 
in the study were based on these person-specific perceptions of the risk.  This process more 
accurately reflects the actual situation facing the respondent and avoids any errors 
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inadvertently introduced by respondents failing to take experimenter-defined probabilities at 
face value, a potential problem noted by Viscusi (1989). 
 
Given that understanding and answering “risk-risk” questions is almost certainly not an easy 
task for anyone not already familiar with this sort of exercise, the focus group protocol then 
moved on to a “practice and familiarization” session in which respondents were presented 
with a “contextless” risk-risk question in which the potential causes of death were not 
identified and in which the baseline risks differed from any of those that had been discussed 
in the first stage.  In this question respondents chose between increasing the annual risk of 
what was labelled “Accident 1” by 10 in 50 million or, alternatively, increasing the annual 
risk of “Accident 2” by 10 in 50 million, with the baseline risks for the two causes set at 20 in 
50 million and 550 in 50 million respectively3.  Depending on which of the two risk increases 
was chosen by the respondent, that increase in risk was then raised until the respondent 
swapped over and selected the (lower) risk increase for the other cause of death.  There then 
followed a fairly extensive group discussion of each respondent’s thought process and reasons 
for choosing in the particular way that he or she had in fact done. 
 
Quite apart from its importance as a means of familiarizing respondents with the “risk-risk” 
question format, this practice session was also intended to remove from respondents’ 
immediate consciousness the actual baseline risks underpinning each of the causes of death to 
be considered later in the session.  More specifically, if the subsequent “contextless” risk-risk 
questions were to serve their intended purpose, then ideally these questions should be 
answered without any knowledge of the causes giving rise to the risks concerned.  
Encouragingly, all respondents in the follow-up qualitative study conducted on a subset of the 
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original study participants confirmed that the “cause-disassociation” objective had been 
achieved. 
 
Following the practice and familiarization exercise, the focus group protocol then moved on 
to the “contextless” phase per se in which respondents  – on an individual rather than group 
basis – answered six “risk-risk” questions in which the nature of the cause concerned was 
deliberately not identified so that responses would in principle reflect only respondents’ 
attitudes to personal baseline risk levels rather than dread. In all cases respondents initially 
chose between increasing the annual risk of what was labelled “Accident C” by x in 50 
million or increasing the annual risk of the other cause (e.g. labelled “Accident A”, “Accident 
B” etc.) by x in 50 million with x set at either 10 or 30 for each pairwise choice depending on 
the magnitude of the actual baseline risk. As already noted, each respondent was provided 
with quantitative baseline risk information that had been “tailored” to their earlier responses 
to the question concerning their perceived exposure to the particular cause which (unknown to 
them in the “contextless” phase) in fact underpinned the baseline risk level concerned.  
Having selected the cause (say Accident C) which they would prefer to have the increment of 
x in 50 million added to the specified baseline risk, they were then asked how large the 
increment in the risk of Accident C would have to be before they would switch to a 
preference for having an increment of x in 50 million added to the specified baseline risk for 
the other cause (say Accident B). 
 
The focus group protocol then proceeded to its final “contextual” phase which began with an 
open-ended discussion of the various different accident causes clearly identified (e.g. rail 
accident or fire in a public place) followed by a ranking exercise in which each participant 
ranked the accident causes from “worst” (i.e. the one they most dreaded) to “best” (i.e. the 
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one they least dreaded). More specifically, respondents were asked to imagine that, for 
whatever reason, they were inevitably going to die by one of the identified causes in the very 
near future and were then asked to rank the causes in terms of the extent to which they feared 
or dreaded death by each cause.  Quite apart from affording an initial focus on the notion of 
dread, this exercise provided the basis for a test of convergent validity of the empirical 
procedure that we used to estimate dread effects for the various causes of death, in that a 
minimal requirement for such validity would appear to be a close correspondence – at the 
level of the individual – between these estimated dread effects and a respondent’s ranking of 
causes in terms of fear or dread. 
 
Following the ranking exercise, participants were then handed a sheet of paper that gave them 
the average annual baseline risk for each cause as well as their earlier assessment of the risk 
they personally faced and they were asked to add a few words or a sentence summarising their 
feelings towards the different causes.  Armed with this information, each participant then 
answered five contextual risk-risk questions in which the causes of the accidents concerned 
were clearly identified4.    
 
3. Responding rationally to risk-risk questions 
Consider an individual facing the possibility of death in either of two contexts, A and B, with 
baseline annual risks of say; 400 in 5 million and 10 in 50 million respectively.  Suppose in 
addition that the individual is offered the choice between increasing the risk of death in 
context A to 410 in 50 million or, alternatively, increasing the risk in context B to 20 in 50 
million (i.e. a choice between increment of 10 in 50 million to one or other of the two risks).  
Prima facie it is tempting to suppose that if the choice is posed in a “contextless” format so 
that there are no differential dread effects at work, then the individual will be indifferent 
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between the two alternatives since they appear to involve an initial total risk of death of 410 
in 50 million prior to the risk increase which would then rise to an overall risk of 420 in 50 
million whichever of the two causes the increment of 10 in 50 million was added to. 
 
Certainly, indifference would be implied if a) the two risks were taken to be mutually 
exclusive b) no differential dread effects applied and c) the individual made the choice in a 
conventionally rational manner.  However, if instead the risks were taken to be independent 
then, as shown below, even a completely rational individual would display a strict preference 
for adding the incremental risk to the lower  baseline, i.e. context B. But why might one view 
the two risks as being independent rather than mutually exclusive?  We believe that there are 
in fact very persuasive reasons for doing to.  To see why, consider the (admittedly somewhat 
extreme) case of an individual facing the possibility of death during the coming period by one 
of two causes, the first involving a probability of death of 0.9 and the other a probability of 
death of 0.1  Is the individual certain to die during the period concerned?  Most of us would, 
one suspects, conclude that the answer is “no” and that the individual could – albeit with very 
low probability – escape death by either cause.  But of course if the risks are mutually 
exclusive then the probability of death is 0.9 + 0.1 = 1 and death is a certainty.  If, by contrast, 
the risks are taken to be independent then the individual faces a non-zero survival probability 
of (1-0.9)(1-0.1) = 0.09.  In this case, therefore, independence appears to make much more 
sense than mutual exclusivity.  Admittedly, as the size of the risks concerned gets smaller 
then the difference between independence and mutual exclusively diminishes, but it would 
nonetheless appear that in general terms independence is the more plausible assumption. 
 
The sceptical reader might, of course, respond that since one presumably can actually die by 
only one cause and since independence of two events admits the possibility of the occurrence 
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of both, then from a logical point of view independence is ruled out in this context.  But our 
response to this is simple.  In particular, suppose the two “experiments” that may result in 
death  are conducted at different times with, say, experiment A preceding experiment B.  If 
experiment A turns out badly (with, say, probability p) then the person dies by cause A and 
that is the end of the matter.  If, on the other hand, the individual survives experiment A (with 
probability 1 – p) then experiment B takes place with its probability (say q) of a bad outcome 
unaffected by the happy outcome of the first experiment.  Thus, before either experiment 
takes place,  the probability of surviving experiment A and then subsequently dying in B is 
given by (1 – p)q  so that the overall probability of dying by one or other cause is p + (1 – p)q 
and the overall probability of surviving both experiments is therefore 1 – [p + (1 – p) q] = (1 – 
p) (1 – q).  Under these circumstances the assumption of independence therefore makes 
perfectly good sense. However, as already noted, the effective difference between 
independence and mutual exclusivity depends on the magnitude of p and q. In particular, with 
p and q both small then the product pq will be negligible and the numerical difference 
between independence and mutual exclusivity trivial. On the other hand, if p and/or q are 
relatively large the difference may be substantial. 
 
But what, then, can we say about rationality?  Faced with a choice between adding an 
increment x to either p or q and treating the experiments as a sequence of independent trials, 
in the absence of any differential dread effects an individual who was rational in the 
conventional sense would simply compare overall survival probability (1 – p – x) (1 – q) with 
overall survival probability (1 – p) (1 – q – x) and would select whichever was the larger of 
the two.  Since (1 – p – x) (1 – q) > (1 – p) (1 – q – x) if and only if (1 – p)x > (1 – q)x, it 
follows that with x >  0 the necessary and sufficient condition for the individual to prefer the 
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increment in risk to be added to q rather than p is q < p, that is,  the individual would strictly 
prefer to add the increment in risk to the smaller of the two baseline risks. 
 
Furthermore, in the absence of any differential dread effects the increment y  which, when 
added to the lower baseline probability q, would render the individual indifferent  to the 
addition of x to p would be such that :  
 (1 – p – x) (1 – q) = (1 – p) (1 – q – y)       (2) 
or equivalently : 
 x.
p)(1
q)(1y
−
−
=            (3) 
Two results follow immediately from equation (3).  First, though with q < p it is necessarily 
the case that y>x, nonetheless with p, q and x all  small it follows that the extent to which y 
will exceed x will also be small.  On the other hand, from equation (3) it also follows that as 
q1ysop,1x −→−→  or equivalently ,x pyq +→+ that is, the indifference increment y gets 
closer to that which would cause the absolute risk of death by cause B, q + y,  to be equal to 
the absolute risk of death p + x by cause A. 
 
In the light of these conclusions concerning the possible ways in which a rational individual 
might be expected to respond to a contextless risk-risk question, we now consider the ways in 
which our respondents did in fact deal with these questions and the extent to which these 
actual response patterns can be taken to constitute a satisfactory basis for inferring overall 
dread effects. 
 
4. The actual risk-risk response patterns. 
Early in the study it became clear that in answering the contextless risk-risk questions in 
particular, respondents were, broadly speaking, employing one of three heuristics (or at least 
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variants thereof).   Thus again suppose that we have two contexts, A and B, with baseline 
annual risks of 400 in 50 million and 10 in 50 million respectively.  Faced with a choice 
between an increase of 10 in 50 million in the risk of either A or B, the extreme variants of 
the three heuristics (and we would stress that these are the extreme variants) would then be as 
follows: 
 
• Incremental risk equalization (IRE) would entail indifference between the two 
increments, so that the initial choice would be made on a random basis.  
However, as argued above, while indifference would certainly be entailed if 
the two risks were taken to be mutually exclusive, the latter assumption 
appears to be somewhat implausible, with independence appearing to make 
rather more sense and in this case the individual would have a strict preference 
for the increase in risk to be applied to the lower baseline risk i.e. context B.  
Nonetheless, with a very large risk denominator (in our case 50 million) 
indifference would require only a minute increase above 10 for the incremental 
risk for B.   
 
 
• Absolute risk equalization (ARE) would entail that the initial choice would be 
an increment of 10 in 50 million to the risk of B.  Only when the incremental 
risk of B had risen to 400 in 50 million would the two incremental risks be 
judged indifferent (i.e. an increment of 10 in 50 million to the risk of A and an 
increment of 400 in 50 million to the risk of B resulting in absolute risk 
equalization at 410 in 50 million for both risks) 
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• Incremental risk-ratio equalization (IRRE) would entail that the initial choice 
would be an increase of 10 in 50 million to the risk of A.  Only when the 
incremental risk of A had risen to 400 in 50 million would the two incremental 
risks be judged indifferent on the grounds that an increment of 400 in 50 
million would double the risk of A, just as an increment in 10 in 50 million 
would double the risk of B. 
 
While these three heuristics are, admittedly, fundamentally different, it is important to 
appreciate that  a not entirely implausible rationale can be offered for versions of each of all 
three.  Thus, as already argued above, incremental risk equalization would follow from the 
assumption of mutual exclusivity of the two risks and would also be closely approximated 
given independence provided that the risks concerned were sufficiently small. In the case of 
absolute risk equalization, the assumption of independence, together with a tendency to ignore 
or mentally deflate the size of the risk denominator of 50 million would quite reasonably lead 
to application of a variant of this heuristic.  In turn, incremental risk-ratio equalization would 
tend to follow from an understandable (if strictly misguided) tendency to focus upon the fact 
that, for example, a 2.5% increase from 400 to 410 is very small relative to a 100% increase 
from 10 to 20. 
 
Nonetheless, it is vital to appreciate that despite the difference between the three heuristics, 
the ratio of dread premia entailed by equation (1) will in fact be quite unaffected  by which 
heuristic is actually used, provided that the respondent employs the same basic heuristic in 
answering both the contextless and contextual risk-risk questions.  To see why, suppose for 
example  that context A is low-dread while context B is high-dread.  Further suppose that we 
have a society of six people of which individuals 1 and 2 are incremental risk equalizers, 
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individuals 3 and 4 are extreme absolute risk equalizers and individuals 5 and 6 are extreme 
incremental risk-ratio equalizers. 
 
In the contextless case, faced with an initial choice between an increase of 10 in 50 million in 
the annual risk of either A or B, with the chosen option then having its risk increased up to the 
point of indifference, given that the other risk increase is held constant at 10 in 50 million, the 
indifference risk increases would then be: 
 
 Individual  A  B 
              1               10 10 
                2  10 10   
                3  10      400 
                4             10      400 
                   5             400        10 
                   6             400        10 
In turn, suppose that once the contexts are identified, given that the dread factor for B 
substantially exceeds that for A, then the indifference risk increases alter to: 
 Individual A B 
                1             20        10 
                2  20 10  
                 3             10      200 
                 4              10      200 
                 5             800       10 
                 6             800       10 
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Consider first individuals 1 and 2 (the incremental risk equalizers).  For these individuals we 
have: 
 
( )( )10x5010/ 10
x5010/
qδ
pδ
6
6
=
ˆ
ˆ
           (4) 
     and 
( )( )10x5010/ 10
x5020/
δq
δp
6
6
=           (5) 
      
so that from equations (1), (4) and (5) we have: 
2DBA =             (6) 
that is for the incremental risk equalizers the dread effect for context B relative to that for 
context A is 2. 
 
In turn, for individuals 3 and 4 (the extreme absolute risk equalizers) we have: 
 
( )( )10x50400/ 10
x5010/
qδ
pδ
6
6
=
ˆ
ˆ
           (7) 
  and 
 
( )( )10x50200/ 10
x5010/
δq
δp
6
6
=          (8) 
so that from equations (1), (7) and (8) we have: 
 2DBA = .           (9) 
Finally, for individuals 5 and 6 (the extreme incremental risk-ratio equalizers) we have: 
 
( )( )10x5010/ 10
x50400/
qδ
pδ
6
6
ˆ
ˆ
           (10) 
 and 
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( )( )10x5010/ 10
x50800/
δq
δp
6
6
=           (11) 
so that from equations (1), (10) and (11) it follows that 
 2DBA = .          (12) 
Clearly, therefore, while the extreme versions of each of the three choice heuristics not 
surprisingly produce very different indifference incremental risk ratios, the implied relative 
dread effects are precisely the same in all three cases.  This strongly suggests that more 
modest variants of each of the three heuristics would also yield the same result.  In the light of 
this, we feel confident that provided a respondent employs the same basic heuristic in 
answering both the contextless and contextual risk-risk questions, then estimation of the 
respondent’s relative dread effect for the two causes of death concerned using equation (1) 
will, to all intents and purposes, yield a result that is effectively independent of the precise 
heuristic employed by the respondent.  In order to obtain empirical estimates, we have 
therefore proceeded by computing individual relative dread effects on the basis of equation 
(1). 
 
Having considered the estimation of individual dread effects, the question that then arises is 
how these individual effects are to be aggregated into an overall sample estimate.  The first 
point to note is that as in most stated-preference empirical exercise, this study produced a 
small number of extreme outliers which have a very marked effect on the untrimmed sample 
arithmetic mean.  For example, in the case of rail relative to pedestrian fatalities, the 
untrimmed arithmetic mean relative dread effect for our sample of some 140 responses was 
14,532:1, whereas with the top and bottom four outliers trimmed out this fell to 185:1.  By 
contrast, the median rail : pedestrian relative dread effect was 3.1:1 while the untrimmed 
geometric mean was 8.6:1.  To the extent a) that there are bound to be doubts about the 
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reliability of extreme outlier responses and b) that it is ethically questionable to allow a few 
individuals to have a very marked effect upon potentially important safety-related policy 
issues, then there would seem to be a powerful argument in favour of focusing upon the 
sample median and/or geometric mean responses as the key central tendency indicators of 
public attitudes towards dread.  But particularly in the case of ratios – which is precisely what 
dread effects (as we have defined them) actually are – there is a further very powerful a priori 
argument in favour of using the geometric mean provided that there are no zero observations 
as will necessarily be the case in a study such as this5.  In particular, consider a two-person 
society in which individual 1’s relative dread ratio for two contexts A and B was 2:1 while the 
other pension’s ratio was 0.5:1.  For the society as a whole, weighing the two individual’s 
interests equally, there would appear to be no grounds whatsoever for treating the overall 
social dread ratio as being other than 1:1 which is, of course, precisely the result given by the 
geometric mean of the individual responses and not by either the arithmetic mean or median, 
both of which would yield a ratio of 1.25:1.  Notice that exactly the same result would emerge 
even if the relative dread ratios were inverted (i.e. the dread of context B relative to context A 
rather than A relative to B).  All things considered therefore, there would appear to be a very 
persuasive practical and ethical case in favour of using the geometric mean as the appropriate 
central tendency measure in a study such as this6. 
  
5.  Findings of the focus group study 
Focus group sessions – which typically involved four participants selected on a quota basis 
from Newcastle, Norwich and Edinburgh by a professional sample survey organisation – were 
carried out during November and December 2003 and were moderated by two of the authors 
of this paper and two trained research assistants.  The total sample size was 157, of which 112 
participants employed some variant of the absolute risk equalization heuristic in answering 
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the risk-risk questions, 22 some variant of the incremental risk-ratio equalization heuristic and 
11 the incremental risk equalization heuristic, the remaining 12 participants having failed to 
provide a full set of usable answers to the risk-risk questions. 
 
Given that its baseline risk falls in the middle of the range of risks considered in the study – 
and given that everyone is, in some sense, subject to this risk - murder was treated as the 
common “comparator” context in the risk-risk questions. Individual dread effects were 
therefore first computed relative to murder.  These individual effects were then normalised 
with respect to the individual’s dread effect for pedestrian accident relative to murder, as 
pedestrian accident appeared to be the least dreaded of those contexts that were considered by 
all participants in the study (see footnote 4).   The results are reported in Table 2 along with 
the sample arithmetic mean initial ranking of the contexts from 1 (least dreaded) to 5 (most 
dreaded).  Recall that this ranking exercise was undertaken by respondents on an individual 
basis prior to answering the contextual risk-risk questions.  As such, the initial rankings on 
the one hand, and the estimated dread effects on the other, represent independently derived 
rankings of the same set of preferences.  As a result of the normalization, murder does not 
appear in Table 2 or in the rest of the data analysis.  However, focusing on the original 
“dread” effects relative to murder it transpires that all of the other contexts had a geometric 
mean “dread” effect less that 1, indicating that murder is the most dreaded of all of the 
contexts considered in the study. 
Table 2 about here 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the study’s findings, we believe that it is important to stress the 
fact that the estimated dread effects reported in table 2 were derived from risk-risk questions 
in which personal baseline risk had been set (in both the contextless and contextual cases) at 
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levels that reflected the respondent’s own assessment of the extent of his/her personal 
exposure to the risk of the particular cause of death concerned. To this extent, we are 
confident that the dread effects reported in table 2 really do reflect dread per se, rather than 
the level of personal exposure to risk. 
 
The first and rather encouraging point to note about the results reported in Table 2 is the clear 
prima facie evidence of convergent validity reflected in the relatively close correspondence 
between the means of respondents’ initial ranking of the contexts in terms of dread and the 
ranking in terms of our estimated “dread” effects.  In turn, given that the original “dread” 
effects relative to murder plainly indicated  that the latter was the most dreaded of all contexts, 
it seems that murder, rail accidents and fires in public places can all be regarded as being clear 
dread risks in the eyes of the public. In the case of automobile driver/passenger accidents, 
hazardous production plants, drowning and domestic fires the dread effects are less marked,  
while the only contexts that show up as having no “dread” effect – at least relative the other 
causes – are pedestrian accidents and accidents in the home. Reassuringly, it also turns out 
that the dread effects for automobile driver/passenger in samples S and B are not statistically 
significantly different from each other. 
 
Given these findings we now turn to a consideration of their validity and reliability. 
 
 
6.  Validity of the estimation procedures 
We apply three distinct validity tests to our procedures and/or data.  These are considered in 
turn. 
(i) Theoretical validity 
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As already argued above in  Section 4, fairly plausible processes of interpretation and analysis 
of the data presented in the questions could quite reasonably lead a respondent to adopt a 
variant of any one of the three heuristics that appeared to underpin the answers to the risk-risk 
questions posed in the study (though in the case of incremental risk-ratio equalization it has to 
be admitted that the rationalization offered was perhaps somewhat less persuasive than for the 
other two heuristics).  Furthermore, at least in the case of the illustrative question and 
responses discussed above in Section 4, it transpired that while the three heuristics not 
surprisingly produced very different responses to the risk-risk questions, our proposed 
procedure for inferring dread effects from the responses to these questions in fact produced 
identical results  for each of the three heuristics.  
 
As far as the actual survey results themselves are concerned, had the subsamples of 
respondents employing each of the three heuristics been sufficiently large then it would 
clearly have been appropriate to compute and compare the dread effects estimated from each 
of the three subsamples.  However, in the case of incremental risk-ratio equalizers and – even 
more so for incremental risk equalizers – the subsample sizes are plainly too small to make 
this a very meaningful exercise.  For example, in the case of hazardous production plant, only 
one of the useable Set B responses was provided by an incremental risk equalizer. 
 
Nonetheless, it was the case that both Set S and Set B respondents answered risk-risk 
questions for pedestrian as well as automobile driver/passenger accidents, so that it seems not 
entirely unreasonable to compare the dread effects for automobile drivers/passenger relative 
to pedestrians across the three subsamples.  In doing so it  should, however, still be borne in 
mind that the subsample sizes for incremental risk-ratio and incremental risk equalizers are 
still very small (22 and 11 respectively) so that dread effect estimates for these subsamples 
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are particularly prone to outlier effects.  Table 3 therefore presents  estimated geometric mean 
dread effects for automobile driver/passenger relative to pedestrian for each of the three 
subsamples, both on an untrimmed basis and also with four incremental risk-ratio outliers 
removed.  
Table 3 about here 
 
Plainly, with the notable exception of the incremental risk-ratio equalization subsample, the 
results presented in Table 3 are broadly encouraging in that, relative to the rankings and dread 
effects for, say, rail accidents or fire in a public place reported above in Table 2, the IRE and 
ARE subsample dread effects both point broadly in the same direction, indicating that while 
automobile driver/passenger accidents are a little more dreaded than pedestrian accidents, the 
IRE and ARE dread effects for the automobile case are not of the same order of magnitude as 
rail or fire in a public place.  Most significantly, this result tends to allay concerns that the 
“absolute risk equalization” heuristic may have biased the study’s findings relative to the 
other heuristic that prima facie, seems to sit most comfortably with conventional choice 
theory, namely IRE.  Turning to the IRRE responses, it is clear that outliers are doing a 
considerable amount of work, with the estimated dread effect being more than halved by 
removal of 4 (out of 22) responses.  Indeed if a further 4 are removed then the figure falls to 
1.70.  Prima facie, therefore, the IRRE responses appear to be somewhat at odds with the rest 
of the sample, which is perhaps not so surprising given that, as indicated above, the rationale 
for the IRRE heuristic is rather less persuasive than that which might be taken to underpin the 
other two heuristics. 
 
All things considered, therefore, it would appear that as far as the theoretical validity of our 
estimation procedure is concerned the message is generally on the positive side. 
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(ii) Face validity 
As far as face (or “content”) validity is concerned, a follow-up qualitative study carried out on 
thirteen participants indicated a high degree of understanding and careful thought concerning 
the questions that respondents were asked.  Importantly, in 12 out of 13 cases, respondents 
described a consistent use of their chosen risk heuristic across the contextless and contextual 
questions, which is of course necessary if the argument underpinning equation (1) and our 
subsequent interpretation of responses are to hold.  Further, respondents appeared to give 
answers that were indeed reflective of their feelings of fear and dread concerning the 
premature fatality risks in different contexts7. 
(iii) Convergent validity. 
It is important to recall that prior to answering the contextual risk-risk questions, respondents 
were asked to imagine that they were inevitably going to die by one or another of the various 
causes of accidental death in the very near future and then to rank the causes in terms of fear 
or dread.  Clearly, a comparison of each respondent’s direct ranking of the causes in terms of 
fear or dread on the one hand with the ranking entailed by the dread effects estimated from the 
respondent’s answers to the contextless and contextual risk-risk questions on the other, 
provides a very direct test of convergent validity at the individual level given that, in an ideal 
world, for each individual respondent the two rankings should be identical.   
In view of this, we carried out a two-tailed Sign Test of Equality of Matched Pairs8 which 
provided no evidence of a significant difference between individual rankings even at the 60% 
level.  This we regard as convincing evidence of the convergent validity of our dread effect 
estimation procedure and the consistency of our respondents. 
 
Given the potentially confounding impact of a few extreme upper-tail outliers, we then ran a 
regression of the log of individual dread ratios against dummies for all of the accident types, 
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controlling for the effect of the gender, age and the income of each respondent. The anti-logs 
of the resulting ‘dread coefficients’ on each of the accident types were insignificantly 
different to the previously reported geometric means and this adds further support to the 
convergent validity of our dread effect estimation procedure. 
 
7.  Dread effects vs baseline risks  
 
In order to apply our findings at an aggregate (i.e. policy-relevant) level, it would be 
necessary to have access to estimated VSLs for all of the relevant contexts, along with 
baseline risk and estimated dread effects taken from the same sample.  It would then in 
principle be possible to examine the way in which baseline risks, as well as dread effects, 
impact statistically on the VSLs for the contexts concerned.  Unfortunately, however, at the 
time of writing, to the best of our knowledge such a comprehensive data set does not exist.  
One might therefore reasonably leave it to the reader to take our estimated dread effects – 
along with baseline risk data – and compare these informally with those VSL estimates that 
do exist – albeit derived from different studies/samples.  The latter include, in particular, the 
U.K. roads VSL – see Carthy et al. (1999) – together with pre and post-Ladbroke Groves 
estimates of the UK rail VSL, as well as VSL estimates for fires in the home and fires in 
public places – see Chilton et al. (2002). 
 
However, freely admitting the extremely small sample size and the questionable use of data 
derived from different samples and at different times, for illustrative purposes we nonetheless 
have run a simple linear regression of the form: 
 
iiii uDBVSL ++= βα                                                                                        (13) 
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where iB  is the mean baseline risk in context i, iD is our estimated dread effect reported 
above in Table 2 and iu  is a random error term.  The function has been constrained to pass 
through the origin given that, in the hypothetical “perfect-world” case of zero dread and zero 
baseline risk, one might reasonably expect a zero VSL.  The results of this regression analysis 
are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Denoting the roads VSL for subsample S by VSLRDS and for subsample B by VSLRDB, the rail 
VSL by VSLRL etc, the VSLs predicted from our regression analysis are as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 about here 
  
In turn, the percentage contribution of baseline risk and dread effects to our predicted VSLs 
are given in Table 6. 
Table 6 about here 
 
A more detailed account of the regression analysis is available from the authors on request. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
The results reported above were generated from a new protocol designed specifically to 
isolate and measure the extent of an individual’s dread of premature death by a given cause 
and, in particular, to quantify the impact of this dread effect on the individual’s marginal rate 
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of substitution of wealth for risk of death by that cause.  In attempting to do this, it is clearly 
essential that the protocol concerned should be capable of separating the dread effect from the 
other factor that past research suggests has a major impact on the individual’s MRS of wealth 
for risk, namely their perception of the baseline level of their own personal exposure to the 
risk concerned. During the process of development and implementation of the protocol it 
became clear that some difficult theoretical and empirical issues had to be addressed if the 
results were to have any validity in and of themselves and, further, if the procedures were to 
be potentially useful in safety policy making in the future.   
 
In view of this, the protocol was subjected to various validity tests with respect to which it 
appeared to perform fairly well. However, it has been suggested to us that an unacceptably 
large number of respondents may well simply not have understood the questions that we put 
to them – hence the prevalence of variants of the absolute risk equalization heuristic.  Our 
response to this criticism is twofold.  
 
First, as we have already noted, the results of our various validity tests and follow-up 
qualitative interviews suggest that pervasive confusion on the part of the respondents – and 
the randomness of the responses which one might expect such confusion to generate – are 
simply not evident in the quantitative or qualitative findings of our study. Thus, we conclude 
that our responses in the main reflect consistent (and well-understood) behavioural choices on 
the part of our respondents.  While the majority of these responses perhaps differ to some 
extent from what might be expected on the basis of conventional choice theory, this is 
nonetheless the way in which participants in our study actually chose between options in a 
variety of scenarios.   
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Second, the probability questions that we put to our respondents were as simple and 
straightforward as it is possible to make such questions.   In addition, early exercises in the 
group protocol helped respondents to understand the questions and the effect on their overall 
risk of death of alternative response strategies. Thus, to ask first whether a respondent would 
prefer to have an unavoidable increment of 10 in 50 million added to the baseline annual risk 
of death in context A or in context B and then if, say, context A is chosen, to iterate the 
increment in context A upward until the respondent regards it as being equally as bad as the 
incremental risk of 10 in 50 million in context B, does not seem to us to be excessively 
complicated, even if somewhat demanding.  Data from the qualitative study supports this 
conclusion.  Indeed, if such questions were too difficult for our respondents, then we are 
bound to ask how any confidence whatsoever can be placed in the findings of earlier risk-risk 
studies or, for that matter, any stated-preference studies in the safety field.  While we accept 
that by their very nature, studies of this type cannot be expected to produce high-precision 
“point” estimates, we nonetheless firmly believe that they are capable of giving a pretty clear 
and reliable indication of the broad order of magnitude of preference-based costs and values 
that are an absolute prerequisite for responsible public-sector allocative and regulatory 
decision making in a free society.  
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Table 1: Baseline Average Annual Risks 
 
Hazard Baseline Average Annual Risk 
Automobile driver/passenger 1400 in 50 million 
Rail* 40 in 50 million 
Domestic Fire 400 in 50 million 
Fire in Public Place 30 in 50 million 
Hazardous Production Plant 250 in 50 million 
Pedestrian 800 in 50 million 
Murder 250 in 50 million 
Drowning 100 in 50 million 
Accident in the Home 2000 in 50 million 
    * Excluding trespassers and suicides  
 
Table 2 :Ranking and “Dread  Effect” Relative to Pedestrian Accident 
 
Accident 
Cause 
Rank Dread Effect 
(Geometric Mean) 
Set S1   
pedestrian accident 1.00 1.00 
accident in the home 1.00 0.81 
automobile 
driver/passenger 
accident 
1.22 1.67 
rail accident 1.33 8.65 
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fire in a public place 2.32 5.80 
   
Set B1   
pedestrian accident 1.00 1.00 
automobile 
driver/passenger 
accident 
1.10 1.40 
hazardous production 
plant accident 
1.39 1.53 
drowning 1.53 1.88 
domestic fire 2.00 1.45 
1. Set S = a common risk increment of 10 in 50 million; 
             Set B = a common risk increment of 30 in 50 million.   
 
 
Table 3: Estimated Dread Effects for the Three Heuristics  
 
Accident   Dread Effect (Geometric Mean) 
Cause Whole Sample (n=145) IRE (n=11) ARE (n=112) IRRE (n=22) 
 
Pedestrian 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
Automobile 
Driver/Passenger 
 
1.53 
(1.29)* 
 
2.37 
 
1.01 
 
11.15 
(4.8)* 
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* Four IRRE outliers trimmed out. 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated Regression Coefficients 
 
 Pre-Ladbroke Grove Post-Ladbroke Grove 
 Coefficient             P value Coefficient              P value 
α
 3.96 x 1010             0.035 3.84 x 1010              0.028 
β
 
150,107.4               0.034 
 
165,740.4                0.019 
 
Table 5: Predicted VSLs 
 
 Pre-Ladbroke Grove Post-Ladbroke Grove 
VSLRDS £1.3595 x 106 £1.3520 x 106 
VSLRDB £1.3180 x 106 £1.3072 x 106 
VSLRL £1.3301 x 106 £1.4644 x 106 
VSLPF £1.8944 x  106 £1.9843 x 106 
VSLDF £0.5344 x 106 £0.5475 x 106 
VSLAIH £1.7056 x 106 £1.6686 x 106 
VSLHPP £0.4277 x 106 £0.4456 x 106 
VSLDR £0.3614 x 106 £0.3884 x 106 
VSLPED £0.7837 x 106 £0.7737 x 106 
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Table 6: Contribution of Baseline Risk and Dread Effects to Predicted VSLs 
 
 Pre-ladbroke Grove Post-Ladbroke Grove 
 Baseline Risk Dread Baseline Risk Dread 
RDS 82% 18% 80% 20% 
RDB 84% 16% 82% 18% 
RL 2% 98% 2% 98% 
PF 3% 97% 2% 98% 
DF 59% 41% 56% 44% 
AIH 93% 7% 92% 8% 
HPP 46% 54% 43% 57% 
DR 22% 78% 20% 80% 
PED 81% 19% 79% 21% 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The Value of Statistical Life is defined essentially as the aggregate willingness to pay for small individual risk 
reductions which, taken over the affected group of people, will reduce the expected number of fatalities during a 
forthcoming period by precisely one. Under appropriate assumptions, this aggregate willingness to pay can be 
shown to be equal to the arithmetic mean of individual marginal rates of substitution of wealth for risk of death 
for the group concerned  – see for example, Jones-Lee (1976). An alternative terminology – increasingly used by 
Government and related agencies in the UK – is the “Value of Preventing a Statistical Fatality (VPF)”, though it 
should be stressed that this is precisely synonymous with the VSL. 
2
 Aircraft accidents were not included because the baseline risk for such accidents is minuscule by comparison 
with other causes and this had led to serious comparability problems in piloting. 
3
 Risk increases rather than reductions were employed essentially because, at least in whole number terms, there 
is a lower bound to the magnitude of feasible risk reductions.  Thus suppose that a respondent is initially faced 
with a choice between a decrease of 10 in 50 million in the annual risk of death by cause A and a decrease of 10 
in 50 million for cause B.  Suppose also that cause B is dreaded so much more than cause A that the individual’s 
MRS of wealth for risk of death by cause B is twenty times that for cause A.  The individual would therefore 
express a strict preference for reduction in the risk of death by cause B by 10 in 50 million and should only 
become indifferent if the reduction was brought down to ½ in 50 million which for many people would be 
meaningless or at best confusing.  By contrast, in realistic terms, there is no corresponding upper bound for risk 
increases. 
4
 In fact, the sample was split into two subsamples one of which considered one group of five accidents with a 
common risk increment of 10 in 50 million while the other considered a slightly different group with a common 
risk increment of 30 in 50 million.  However, as well as containing a common accident (Murder) by which 
accidents from two subsets could be compared, two other accident types were also common to both subsets, 
namely car driver/passenger fatalities and pedestrian fatalities.  This allowed an in-built consistency check to be 
carried out on responses to the same types of tradeoff. 
5
 Even if a respondent gave a “hard to choose” risk increment response entailing the certainty of death by a given 
cause, this increment would still necessarily be less than 50 x 106  so that the implied relative dread effect, 
though very small, would still be non-zero. 
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6
 In fact there is one other procedure that could sensibly be used in order to arrive at a central tendency measure 
in a study such as this – see Chilton et al (2002). However, this procedure is considerably more complicated and 
less direct and does not produce substantially different results, so that in the interests of expositional simplicity 
we have elected to focus on the geometric mean in this article. 
7
 The results of the follow-up qualitative study were analyzed by Dr. Rachel Baker and are available from the 
authors on request. 
8
 See Snedecor and Cochran, 1989. 
